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Abstract
Is an option to early terminate a swap at its market value worth zero? At first sight it seems so, but in
presence of counterparty risk it depends on the criteria used to determine such market value. In case of a
single uncollateralised swap transaction between two defaultable counterparties, the additional unilateral
option to early terminate the swap at predefined dates requires the evaluation of a Bermudan option. We
give a general pricing formula assuming a default-free close-out amount, and apply it to different kinds
of derivatives in a setting with deterministic default intensity, showing that the impact on the fair value
at inception and on the counterparty risk of the transaction might be non negligible.
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1 Summary
The impact of close-out conventions in the ISDA setting has been highlighted in [1], [2] with particular regard
to the consequences on bilateral counterparty risk adjustments. The authors show how the contractual
definition of the close out amount (“risk-free” vs “substitution”) in case of default has a strong impact on
the fair price of the transaction at inception; moreover, the ISDA Close-out Amount Protocol extends such
conventions to any Additional Early Termination event (ATE), see 6(e)(ii)(1) and pag 17 (par 5) in [10]. A
wide debate [4], [5] has taken place on the implication of the close-out definition and has focused in particular
on the rating-triggered ATEs [3].
Here, we focus instead on how to value a single uncollateralized transaction where a party has the option
to early terminate the transaction at predefined dates by exchanging the default risk-free amount with the
other party. This kind of ATE is commonly introduced to shorten the horizon of the credit line between the
parties; in the following we will refer to it as a break clause (BC). This case is different, and to a certain
extent simpler, from those examined in previous literature, where the exercise date of the early termination
is a priori unknown. We will obtain a general but remarkably simple pricing formula for the case of default-
free close out amount, a choice particularly interesting, as it is the only counterparty-independent one, and
∗This paper reflects the authors’ opinions and not necessarily those of their employers.
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therefore a good candidate to a less arbitrary close-out convention [7], even if it is subject to criticism [1]
when used to determine the settlement amount in case of default of the counterparty.
It is clear that a Bermudan-like optionality is in general related to a BC, and that the strike of the
option is defined by the close-out amount. Our main result shows how the choice of a default risk-free
close-out amount implies a remarkably simple form for the payoff of such an option. On the other hand,
the optionality is worthless only if we assume the close-out amount to be equal to the current value of the
transaction, a quite improbable scenario - at least under the ISDA protocol when the close-out amount is
determined on the basis of the quotations of third parties whose creditworthiness may be far from that of
the original counterparty. Moreover, when the termination event is triggered by a BC, we remark that the
choice of a default risk-free amount naturally arises from the ISDA protocol. In fact, on one hand, if the
parties have specified that mid-market quotations should be used to determine the termination payment, the
default risk of the exercising party does not have to be considered in the quotation (pag 17, par 5 in [10]); on
the other hand, a rational choice for the exercising party that minimizes the CVA that negatively affects the
calculation of the termination amount, is to collect quotations from counterparties with high credit standing
or no default risk (e.g. clearing members of a central counterparty)1.
First, we will apply the pricing formula to show how it works in the simple case of an equity forward with
a unique BC. In this case quasi-analytical results are available, at least assuming deterministic intensities for
the default processes, using the well known Geske-Johnson approach for bermudan derivatives (see e.g. [9]),
which is an effective technique when the exercise dates are few (as is often the case, e.g. for medium dated
swaps, i.e. with maturity between 7 and 10 years). We will then address a more general case by using
the pricing formula on a trinomial tree to evaluate a receiver/payer interest swap with multiple BCs. In
all cases we find considerable impacts on the par strike. Finally, we will briefly discuss how a BC may be
effective in mitigating the counterparty risk related to a transaction, at least from a Basel III perspective,
to the extent that it reduces the variability of the expected loss (the so-called unilateral credit valuation
adjustment - UCVA) due to the deterioration of the credit worthiness of the counterparty. Furthermore, a
mutual BC is even more effective to mitigate the unilateral CVA risk, since it cancels the contribution to the
unilateral CVA after the first exercise date. These results give a strong quantitative support to the capital
relief discussion in [8].
Even if our approach is at a transaction level and cannot easily include the netting effects with other
transactions referenced to the same ISDA agreement, we point out that our work has practical implications,
due to the wide presence in the market of uncollateralized swap referenced to a single-transaction agreement,
or of portfolios composed by a few large transactions with the same side (e.g. a portfolio of payer interest
rate swaps). For instance, consider the case of a derivative between a bank and a corporate, between a
bank and a sovereign (see [6] for a notable example), and of a so-called back-swap linked to securitization
or covered bond. These cases often concern long-dated swaps and typically involve BCs.
2 Notation
In the following we refer to the notation and the results of [2]. The value V ABB (t0) of a derivative contract
between two defaultable counterparty A and B as seen from B in t0, when the first to default effect is taken
into account, is
V ABB (t0) = V
0
B(t0)− E
{
LAIA(t0, T )D(t0, τA)
[
V 0B(τA)
]+∣∣∣ t0}+ E{LBIB(t0, T )D(t0, τB) [−V 0B(τB)]+∣∣∣ t0} ,
(1)
where D(t1, t2) is the stochastic discount factor between two dates, τX is the default time of counterparty
X , T is the last payment date of the derivative, LX the loss given default of counterparty X , IA(t1, t2) =
It1<τA<min(τB ,t2), IB(t1, t2) = It1<τB<min(τA,t2) (the last two terms take into account the order of default of
the counterparties). V 0B(t) is the value of the equivalent default-free derivative as seen from B,
V 0B(t) = E {ΠB(t, T )| t} = E
{
N∑
i=1
D(t, Ti)Ci(Ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ t
}
, (2)
1Such quotations are used to calculate the termination amount, but it is not required under ISDA to replace the transaction
with any of the counterparties providing them.
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with T1 > t, TN = T , and Ci the cashflow paid in Ti that depends on the values of the risk factors (e.g.
interest rates, stock prices) already known in Ti. We also define τ = min(τA, τB), and we will use the
notation PA(t1, t2) = E {IA(t1, t2)}, and analogous for B, for the unconditioned probabilities. We will omit
conditioning on t0 henceforth.
The last two terms in eq. (1) define the Bilateral Credit Valuation Adjustment (BCVA) and Debt Valu-
ation Adjustment (BDVA) respectively as seen from B,
BCV AB(t, T ) = E
{
LAIA(t, T )D(t, τA)
[
V 0B(τA)
]+∣∣∣ t} , (3)
BDV AB(t, T ) = E
{
LBIB(t, T )D(t, τB)
[
−V 0B(τB)
]+∣∣∣ t} , (4)
so that we can write the well known formula
V ABB (t0) = V
0
B(t0)−BCV AB(t0, T ) +BDV AB(t0, T ). (5)
3 Main Results
3.1 Unilateral Break Clause
Let us assume that party B has a BC at time tˆ < T , i.e. she has the right to terminate the derivative at time
tˆ by liquidating its default-free fair value V 0B(tˆ). It is easy to show that the equivalent of eq. (1) becomes
Vˆ ABB (t0) = V
0
B(t0)−
E
{
LAIA
(
t0, tˆ
)
D(t0, τA)
[
V 0B(τA)
]+}
+ E
{
LBIB
(
t0, tˆ
)
D(t0, τB)
[
−V 0B(τB)
]+}
− (6)
E
{
IV 0B(tˆ)≤V
AB
B (tˆ)
(
LAIA(tˆ, T )D(t0, τA)
[
V 0B(τA)
]+
− LBIB(tˆ, T )D(t0, τB)
[
−V 0B(τB)
]+)}
,
the exercise condition of the BC being
V 0B(tˆ) ≥ V
AB
B (tˆ). (7)
By conditioning on tˆ the inner part of the last term in (6), we obtain our main result:
Vˆ ABB (t0) = V
0
B(t0)−BCV AB(t0, tˆ) +BDV AB(t0, tˆ) +
E
{
Iτ>tˆD(t0, tˆ)
[
BDV AB(tˆ, T )−BCV AB(tˆ, T )
]+}
. (8)
The last term is equivalent to
E
{
Iτ>tˆD(t0, tˆ)
[
V ABB (tˆ)− V
0
B(tˆ)
]+}
,
where one easily recognizes the payoff linked to the continuation value of the option to liquidate the derivative
in tˆ.
Equation (8) has essentially the following meaning: the party that is long the BC continues the transaction
at tˆ only if its expected gain (BDVA) exceeds its expected loss (BCVA) or, equivalently, if the value of the
transaction (including the bilateral valuation adjustment) is worth more than the default risk-free value. By
reducing the impact of the bilateral valuation adjustment, a BC brings the value of the transaction near its
default risk-free value. In particular, it reduces the expected loss of the transaction, due to a number of
scenarios in which the BC is exercised and any loss due to the default of the counterparty may arise just
until tˆ instead of the maturity date. Such shortening of the credit exposure’s horizon is the main reason for
which also the counterparty risk in terms of CVA variability is mitigated, as we will show in the Section 4.5
below.
3.2 Multiple Unilateral Break Clause
Define the last three terms of eq. (8) as UBC(t0, tˆ), so that we can write Vˆ
AB
B (t0) = V
0
B(t0) + UBC(t0, tˆ).
If we add an additional BC in tˆ2 > tˆ we can repeat the same arguments of the previous section to see that
eq. (8) becomes
Vˆ ABB,multiple(t0) = V
0
B(t0)−BCV AB(t0, tˆ) +BDV AB(t0, tˆ) + E
{
Iτ>tˆD(t0, tˆ)
[
UBC(tˆ, tˆ2)
]+}
, (9)
and analogous results can be obtained for an arbitrary number of BCs.
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3.3 Mutual Break Clause
In case of mutual BC (i.e. both parties have the right to liquidate the position in tˆ), it is easy to see that, if
both parties apply the same mark-to-market policy, the BC is exercised with certainty. In fact, the exercise
condition for party A is
V 0A(tˆ) ≥ V
AB
A (tˆ), (10)
and since V 0A = −V
0
B and (see again [2]) V
AB
A = −V
AB
B , it becomes
V 0B(tˆ) ≤ V
AB
B (tˆ). (11)
Hence, either A or B will exercise, and we can write
Vˆ ABB,mutual(t0) = V
0
B(t0)−BCV AB(t0, tˆ) +BDV AB(t0, tˆ). (12)
Therefore, a mutual BC will be more effective than a unilateral BC in mitigating the counterparty risk
of a transaction, since the former, if rationally exercised, cancels any loss arising from the default of the
counterparty when it takes place after the BC date.
4 Applications
As in [2], we assume that the default times have a bivariate exponential distribution obtained combining
exponential marginal distributions with constant default intensity P (τX > t) = e
−λX t with a Gumbel copula,
disallowing simultaneous defaults. The resulting survivalship probability reads
P (τA > tA, τB > tB) = e
−[(λAtA)θ+(λBtB)θ]
1/θ
, (13)
with θ ∈ [1,+∞). Observe that Kendall’s Tau τK = 1 − 1/θ, so that the independent case corresponds to
θ = 1, and the comonotonic to θ = ∞. This particular choice of copula is common in the recent literature,
and has the advantage of being analytically tractable. However, the results in terms of relevance of the
unilateral BC in the pricing of derivatives have been found to be qualitatively identical to those obtained
with a Gaussian copula.
Assuming independence between default events and the market risk factors, we rewrite (3) and (4) as
BCV AB(t0, T ) = LA
∫ T
t0
dτA
∫ +∞
τA
dτB p(τA, τB)E
{
D(t0, τA)
[
V 0B(τA)
]+}
, (14)
BDV AB(t0, T ) = LB
∫ T
t0
dτB
∫ +∞
τB
dτA p(τA, τB)E
{
D(t0, τB)
[
−V 0B(τB)
]+}
. (15)
where p(τA, τB) is the probability density of the bivariate default process.
By looking at eqs (8) and (9) one can see that the evaluation of the BC is strictly related to the pricing
of bermudan options. Among the various techniques that can be used to solve this kind of options we will
first use the Geske-Johnson technique, that is well suited only for a small number of exercise dates, and with
some additional approximations leads to analytical results in the case of an equity forward. To generalize our
results, we will then evaluate the BC on a interest rate swap (IRS) using a short rate model on a trinomial
tree, a powerful technique that is widely used in the industry.
4.1 Equity Forward with Simplified Settings
We apply the pricing formula (8) to the case of an equity forward on a non dividend paying stock St following
Black and Scholes dynamics, with strike K, maturity T and unilateral BC at a single date tˆ < T .
To simplify the subsequent formulas let us assume that default can happen up to tˆ− or T−, and in case
of default the parties exchange the close-out amount as evaluated at tˆ or T respectively rather than at the
time of default. For a payer without BC, the pricing formula (5) together with eqs (14) and (15) becomes
V ABB,payer(t0) = S0 −KP (t0, T )−
LAPA(t0, tˆ)Call(t0;KP (tˆ, T ), tˆ) + LBPB(t0, tˆ)Put(t0;KP (tˆ, T ), tˆ)−
LAPA(tˆ, T )Call(t0;K,T ) + LBPB(tˆ, T )Put(t0;K,T ), (16)
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where Call(t;K, τ) (Put(t;K, τ)) stands for the value in t of a European call (put) option with maturity
τ on the contingent claim D(τ, T )(ST − K), and P (tˆ, T ) = E(D(tˆ, T )|tˆ). We point out that the inclusion
of the terms BCVA and BDVA changes the par strike, except when the two counterparies are identical
(LA = LB = L and λA = λB = λ).
Now, introducing the BC in favor of B at tˆ, we have to calculate the last expectation in (6) or (8), which
under our hypotheses becomes
E
{
D(t0, tˆ)
[
LBPB(tˆ, T )Put(tˆ;K,T )− LAPA(tˆ, T )Call(tˆ;K,T )
]+}
,
which is positive when the continuation condition
LBPB(tˆ, T )Put(tˆ;K,T ) ≥ LAPA(tˆ, T )Call(tˆ;K,T ) (17)
is satisfied. In order to apply the Geske-Johnson technique [9], we determine the boundary of such region,
i.e. we look for a Stˆ = U such that
LBPB(tˆ, T )Put(tˆ;K,T ) = LAPA(tˆ, T )Call(tˆ;K,T ); (18)
this allows us to write the call and put payoffs in terms of indicator functions, arriving at the final formula
Vˆ ABB,payer(t0) = S0 −KP (t0, T )−
LAPA(t0, T )Call(t0;KP (tˆ, T ), tˆ) + LBPB(t0, T )Put(t0;KP (tˆ, T ), tˆ) +
LBPB(tˆ, T )E
{
D(T0, T )(K − ST )IStˆ<U IST<K
}
−
LAPA(tˆ, T )E
{
D(T0, T )(ST −K)IStˆ<U IST>K
}
. (19)
It is straightforward to price analytically these barrier options within a Black and Scholes approximation,
computing a two-dimensional Gaussian integral2. Analogous results are obtained for a receiver equity for-
ward.
4.2 Numerical Results - Equity Forward
We evaluate the impact of the BC by comparing the at-the-money strike implied by eq. (19) with that
coming from eq. (16). All the results are obtained for S0 = 1, σt = 0.3, LA = LB = 100% and zero interest
rates. We will report the results also for the receiver forward, that are almost perfectly antithetic to those of
the payer forward (this effect is enhanced by the choice of zero interest rate and dividend yield, and of equal
loss given default). We point out that this instrument is particularly sensitive to counterparty risk, since all
cash flows are concentrated at the end of its life, and is therefore an ideal case to illustrate the effects of the
BC.
We examine first the effect of the distance between tˆ and T for τK = 0 and τK = 0.75. In figure 1, where
λA = 0.1, λB = λA/2, we see that, as tˆ approaches 0, the counterparty risk is completely removed (the par
strike is equal to 1, the at-the-money forward when counterparty risk is not included), since it is convenient
to exercise the BC as soon as possible, being A the riskier counterparty. As tˆ increases, the effect of the
BC is reduced, and the par strike approaches the one implied by the full BCVA and BDVA contributions.
When tˆ is halfway through the life of the forward, it reduces by almost a factor of two the counterparty risk.
On the other hand, after reversing the ratio of the default intensities (λA = 0.05, λB = 2λA), we do not
find any efficient removal of counterparty risk, an effect that is common to other examples below when the
counterparty that is long the BC is more risky than the other, i.e. when λB > λA.
In figure (2) we show for τK between 0 and 0.75 that the correction due to the BC decreases as λB grows
larger than λA and goes to zero faster for large θ. This effect can be explained by noticing that the more
probable it is that τB < τA, the less useful the BC is to B.
Table (1) shows, again with λA = 0.1, λB = λA/2, how effective the BC is in reducing the credit exposure
of the transaction across all values of θ: the par strike of a 4 years and a 2 years equity forward with a BC
after 1 year is almost identical to that of the 1 year forward. As expected, the case with λB > λA (not
shown) displays almost no dependence on the BC.
2a multiple BC with n exercise dates would require a n+ 1-dimensional Gaussian integral.
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Payer Receiver
θ T = 4, tˆ = 1 T = 4 T = 2, tˆ = 1 T = 2 T = 4, tˆ = 1 T = 4 T = 2, tˆ = 1 T = 2
1 0,90 -3,23 0,43 -0,81 -0,90 3,37 -0,43 0,82
2 0,24 -4,42 0,16 -1,09 -0,24 4,70 -0,16 1,12
3 0,06 -5,33 0,06 -1,31 -0,06 5,75 -0,06 1,36
4 0,01 -5,91 0,02 -1,45 -0,01 6,42 -0,02 1,51
5 0,00 -6,23 0,01 -1,53 0,00 6,80 -0,01 1,59
Table 1: Par strike difference (in percent) for various θ for T = 4 and T = 2 equity forwards with λA = 0.1,
λB = 0.05, with and without a BC in tˆ = 1 with respect to the 1y case with no BC. The BC reduces the 4
years and the 2 years cases to the 1y with no BC.
4.3 Numerical Results - Plain Vanilla Swap
To explore further the magnitude of the price change due to the introduction of a unilateral BC, we compute
numerically UBC(t0, tˆ) for a 4 year plain vanilla par interest rate swap (IRS) with semi-annual payments
using a 1 factor Hull & White model with piecewise constant volatility on a trinomial tree calibrated on
market data from August 13th 2010, when the 4 years par swap rate vs Euribor 6m was 1.677% and the
2y2y EUR ATM swaption volatility was 37.6%. The trinomial tree allows for a more accurate computation
of the BCV A(t1, t2) and BDV A(t1, t2). In fact, it is possible to discretize eqs (14) and (15) to get
BCV AB(t0, T ) =
N∑
k=1
LAPA(Tk−1, Tk)E
{
D(t0, Tk−1)
[
V 0B(Tk−1)
]+}
, (20)
BDV AB(t0, T ) =
N∑
k=1
LBPB(Tk−1, Tk)E
{
D(t0, Tk−1)
[
−V 0B(Tk−1)
]+}
, (21)
where the {Tk}k=1,...,N are the dates in which some cash flow is exchanged, with T0 = t0 and TN = T .
The results for both payer and receiver swap with LA = LB = 100%, expressed in terms of the change
in par rate between a swap with no BC and the same swap after the introduction of one BC, are displayed
in figure 3 and 4. They are qualitatively similar to those for the equity forward, and contribute up to a
few basis points to the par rate. Compared with the bid-ask spread of about 1 bp usually encountered in
the OTC market for plain vanilla swaps, this amount is quite significant, even though the same spread for
uncollateralized deals is usually larger. We notice that, since in this case interest rates are not zero, there is
a strong asymmetry between payer and receiver swaps.
4.4 Multiple Break Clauses
We now investigate numerically the effect of multiple BCs in the case of the 4y IRS above. The results
are collected in table 2, where in column tˆ we show the times (in years) at which there is a BC. The main
contribution comes always from the first BC, while the subsequent ones have an impact that is at least one
order of magnitude smaller. This effect is enhanced by the use of constant default intensity. We argue that
the introduction of a dynamics for the default probability should lead to different results, as a consequence
of the possible inversion of the default order during the life of the derivative.
4.5 CVA risk
Having shown the effectiveness of BCs in reducing the BCVA through a mechanism that shortens the credit
exposure of the derivative, we evaluate here its impact on the CVA risk. Basel III has introduced a new capital
charge to cover the CVA risk, which is measured in terms of the sensitivity of the UCVA with respect to the
CDS of the counterparty [11]. We therefore compute numerically the sensitivity of the UCVA with respect
to the counterparty default intensity λA, both with and without a unilateral BC, as this is a good proxy of
the sensitivity defined by the Basel Committee, using the well known market formula λALGD ≈ CDS. The
results for the 4y IRS described previously, collected in table 3, show that the BC significantly reduces also
this risk measure.
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tˆ λA λB θ
Payer
swap (bp)
Receiver
swap (bp)
tˆ λA λB θ
Payer
swap (bp)
Receiver
swap (bp)
1 2 3 0,1 0,05 4 6,0 -2,4 1 2 3 0,05 0,1 4 0,2 0
1 2 0,1 0,05 4 5,9 -2,4 1 2 0,05 0,1 4 0,2 0
1 0,1 0,05 4 5,9 -2,3 1 0,05 0,1 4 0,2 0
2 3 0,1 0,05 4 3,5 -1,2 2 3 0,05 0,1 4 0,2 0
2 0,1 0,05 4 3,5 -1,2 2 0,05 0,1 4 0,2 0
3 0,1 0,05 4 1,2 -0,4 3 0,05 0,1 4 0,1 0
1 2 3 0,1 0,05 1 5,3 -2 1 2 3 0,05 0,1 1 2,4 -0,7
1 2 0,1 0,05 1 5,3 -1,9 1 2 0,05 0,1 1 2,4 -0,7
1 0,1 0,05 1 5,0 -1,7 1 0,05 0,1 1 2,1 -0,5
2 3 0,1 0,05 1 3,1 -1 2 3 0,05 0,1 1 1,5 -0,4
2 0,1 0,05 1 3,1 -1 2 0,05 0,1 1 1,5 -0,4
3 0,1 0,05 1 1,1 -0,3 3 0,05 0,1 1 0,5 -0,1
Table 2: Effect of multiple BCs for a 4 years swap. See text for parameters’ values. The par rate change
with respect to the no-BC case is driven essentially by the time to the first BC.
Payer UCVA sensitivity Receiver UCVA sensitivity
λA λB θ with BC no BC with BC no BC
0,05 0,1 4 1,634 2,812 1,094 1,321
0,05 0,1 1 1,459 2,812 0,892 1,321
0,1 0,05 4 1,209 2,244 0,728 1,089
0,1 0,05 1 1,234 2,244 0,748 1,089
0,1 0,1 4 1,260 2,244 0,753 1,089
0,1 0,1 1 1,260 2,244 0,753 1,089
Table 3: Comparison of sensitivities of UCVA with respect to λA (in bps) with and without BC.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that the financial effect of the BC (both unilateral and bilateral) is quite significant for
various kinds of plain vanilla derivatives and a large range of parameters. The impact is a consequence the
use of the default risk-free close-out amount, which is legitimate according to the ISDA close out protocol.
In particular, the BC mitigates the CVA risk of a transaction and the related Basel III capital charges.
This result must however be contrasted with the historically low propensity of counterparties to exercise
the BC in order not to compromise their relationship with clients.
Our approach can be generalized to more complex BCs, for instance conditioned to rating downgrade,
that we leave for future work. Another development will be to investigate the effect of stochastic default
rates that will add volatility to the credit adjustment and also alter the order of default of the counterparties
by weakening the dependence of the result on the ratio between λB and λA that is kept constant in our
examples.
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Figure 2: Par strike as a function of λB for an equity forward with λA = 0.1, T = 4, tˆ = 2, θ = 1 (full lines),
θ = 2 (dashed lines) and θ = 4 (dotted lines). The correction due to the BC decreases as λB grows larger
than λA and goes to zero faster for large θ.
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Figure 3: Par rate change with respect to the no BC case as a function of tˆ for a 4y payer (positive) and
receiver (negative) IRS with λA = 0.1, λB = 0.05 (blue) and λA = 0.05, λB = 0.1 (red), θ = 4 (full lines)
and θ = 1 (dashed lines). The effect of the BC is larger for tˆ close to 0, for λA < λB and for the payer.
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Figure 4: Par rate change with respect to the no BC case as a function of λB for a payer (blue) and receiver
(red) IRS with λA = 0.1, T = 4, tˆ = 2, θ = 4 (full lines), θ = 2 (dashed lines) and θ = 1 (dotted lines). The
correction due to the BC decreases as λB grows larger than λA and goes to zero faster for large θ.
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